This page is a list of articles and chapters in academic journals or books. For books solely by Robin Attfield please click on 'Books' under 'About Robin Attfield'.

Two in particular are flagged up there  -  Robin's VSI (Very Short Introduction) on Environmental Ethics, which has proved popular with students and the general public, and also his earlier book WONDER , VALUE AND GOD, published by Routledge with a copyright date of 2017. This book bestrides environmental ethics, philosophy of religion and theories of creativity.  It has a splendid cover picture of the Grand Canyon, which we have visited, but sadly I don't think we took this photo!


‘Berkeley and Imagination’, Philosophy, July 1970, 237-39. Berkeley did not run together the distinctions between reality and imagination, reality and dreams, and reality and illusion.

‘Non-Tentative Religious Beliefs and Rationality’, Sophia, July 1970, 16-21. A vindication of the rationality of
religious belief as depicted by Professor Basil Mitchell.

3. ‘Talents, Abilities and Virtues’, Philosophy, 46, July 1971, 255-58. An assessment of Hume’s arguments and motives for declaring voluntariness
inessential to virtue.

4. ‘The Individuality of God’, Sophia, April 1971, 20-27. Against Michael Durrant it is argued that, ‘God’ being sometimes a proper name and sometimes a common name, God is an individual of some not wholly incomprehensible sort.

5. ‘Theology in the Modern University’, in Education for Development, 1.3, March 1971, 23-29. A new look at the logic of the Religious Studies curriculum and the place of philosophy within it.

6. ‘Belief in God’, Sophia, July 1972, XI.2, 1-4. The theistic belief that God is good is not as obviously absurd as J.J. McIntosh thinks.

7. ‘Ffydd wedi ei Hail-wampio ar gyfer Athroniaeth’ (‘Faith Refashioned to Fit Philosophy’), Review Article of D. Z. Phillips, Faith and Philosophical Enquiry,
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970; translated into Welsh by Canon O. G. Rees, in Diwinyddiaeth, XXII, 1971, 26-29.
The philosophy of religion of D. Z. Phillips is criticised for its disdain of Natural Theology.

8. ‘Collective Responsibility’, in Analysis, 32.1, October 1971, 31-32. Statements about the responsibility of Governments are not reducible to
statements about the responsibility of Cabinet Ministers alone, even though some statements of the latter sort must be true for any of the former sort to be true.

9. ‘The Irreducibility of “Meaning”’ (written jointly with Michael Durrant), in Noûs, VII.3, September 1973, 282-98. Demonstrates the circularity of ‘use’ theories of meaning and of analyses of meaning of any other sort.

‘The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy’, in Religious Studies, 9, March 1973, 1-9. Discusses the logical relations between natural theology and the religious appeal to revelation: concludes that we always need reasons for regarding a passage as revelatory.

‘On Euthanasia’, in Contact (Journal of The Scottish Pastoral Association, The Clinical Theology Association and The Institute of Religion and Medicine), 37, March 1972, 10-15.
Argues for the moral acceptability of voluntary contractual euthanasia.

‘On Translating Myth’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11.4, Winter 1971, 228-45. A theory of how to translate passages expressing concepts once significant but now obsolete is developed and applied to a Biblical example.

13. ‘How Things Exist: A Difficulty’ in Analysis, 33.4, March 1973, 141-43. A criticism of Professor G. Owen’s analysis of ‘existence’.

14. ‘Did I Go To Canterbury Willy Nilly?’ in a Royal Institute of Philosophy collection, Philosophy and Psychology, edited S.C. Brown, Macmillan, 1974,
336-38. A note on determinism. (Published without its title.)

15. ‘An Anomaly of Anomalous Monism’, in the same collection (as 14 above), 62-63. A note on materialism. (Published without its title.)

16. ‘Against Incomparabilism’ in Philosophy, 50, 1975, 230-34. Argues against the view that diverse moralities cannot morally be compared.

17. ‘Dr. Azikiwe’s Fourth Arm’, in Second Order, 11.2, July 1973, 86-96. A critical survey of some arguments for retaining the military as an arm of the
government of Nigeria.

18. ‘The Logical Status of Moral Utterances’ in The Journal of Critical Analysis, IV.2, July 1972 (published 1974), 70-84. It is argued that even basic moral propositions have grounds.

19. ‘On Being Human’ in Inquiry, 17, 1974, 175-92. Argues that the development of certain  capacities is necessary for living well as a human.

20. ‘Towards a Defence of Teleology’ in Ethics, 85.2, January 1975, 123-35. Contends that rule-teleology supplies a criterion of moral rightness adequate to the requirements of social justice and preferable to rival theories.

21. ‘Clarke, Collins and Compounds’ in The Journal of the History of Philosophy, XV.1, 1977, 45-54. A critical discussion of a historical debate about

22. ‘Philosophy and Secularisation’, in Thought and Practice (Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya), 2.2, 1975, 135-48. A critique of secularisation over science, ethics and natural theology.

23. ‘The Lord is God: There is No Other’ in Religious Studies, 13, January 1977, 73-84. A detailed reply to Michael Durrant’s book The Logical Status of ‘God’ .

‘Racialism, Justice and Teleology’ in Ethics,
87.2, January 1977, 186-88. A reply to a critic of item 20 (above).

25. ‘Science and Creation’ in The Journal of Religion, 58.1, January 1978, 37-47. The

paradoxical relations between science and theism are

26. ‘Supererogation and Double
Standards’, Mind, LXXXVIII, 1979, 481-99.
Distinct but related standards of the morally desirable and the morally obligatory
are expounded and defended, and with them a theory of supererogation.

27. ‘How not to be a Moral Relativist’,
The Monist, 62.4, 1979, 510-23.
Recent defences of moral relativism are found to escape self-contradic­tion
only at the expense of incurring the charge of implausibility, and to explain
nothing which could not be better explained without resorting to them.

28. ‘The Good of Trees’, Journal of Value Inquiry, 15, 1981,
35-54. Trees not only have needs of their own, pace Professors Hare and Feinberg, but are also of some slight
intrinsic value.

29. ‘Unto the Third and Fourth
Generation’, Second Order,
VIII.1&2, 1979, 55-70. A

theory is developed of reparations due
from and to collections of people lasting more than one generation, and is
related to a teleological theory of moral rightness.

30. ‘The Value of Value Inquiry’, Lettera, 19, 1980, 113-22. Value inquiry
is defended against the widespread belief that values are subjective and
arbitrary. Inquiries in ethics, aesthetics and politics into what is of value
can disclose important truths.

31. ‘Religious Symbols and the Voyage
of Analogy’, International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion, XI.4, 1980, 225-38. The traditional theory of
analogy makes sense of religious language only if one non-analogical
proposition about God can be identified. This is supplied by his nature as
potential creator.

32. ‘Prescriptivity and Justification’,
(written jointly with Michael Durrant), Philosophical
Papers, X, 1981, 16-23. Against D.Z. Phillips and H.O. Mounce, it is
contended that moral rules as well as moral judgements are susceptible of
justification and appraisal.

33. ‘Woolhouse’s Open Future: Not in the Script’, Studia Leibnitiana (Journal of the
Gottfried-Wilhelm-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, Hanover), 12.2, 1980, 229-35. An
interpreta­tion of Leibniz’s Principle of Pre-Determinate History, on which the
future of sub­stances is partially an open one, is criticised as lacking support
and irreconcilable with the texts concerned, and a more traditional
interpretation, on which the careers of substances cannot fail to unfold in
accordance with their complete concepts, is preferred.

34. ‘How Not to Undermine
Theology’, New Blackfriars, 61, 1980,
286-92. Far from the assertion that the divine nature is partially knowable
shaking the foundations of the doctrine of creation, that doctrine is subverted
rather by the negation of that assertion.

35. ‘Thomas Traherne and
Intrinsic Value’, in Edgar Morscher and Rudolf Stranzinger (eds.), Proceedings of the
Fifth International Wittgenstein Symposium, Vienna: Verlag
Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1981, 97-99. The poems and meditations of Traherne
supply grounds independent of theology and ethics for the identification of
both instrumental and intrinsic value.

36. ‘Plantinga and Leibniz’,
a critical study of Alvin Plantinga, The
Nature of Necessity, in Studia
Leibnitiana, 12.2, 1980, 215-20. Four related issues where the views of
Plantinga have a bearing on those of Leibniz are discussed: essentialism,
trans-world identity, the ontological argument and the issue of whether God can
create any pos­sible world.

37. ‘Science, Christianity
and the Roots of Our Ecological Problems’, in Lettera, seconda serie, I, 1982, 35-47, translated by Dr. S.
Gamberini as ‘Teoria scientifica, etica cristiana e le origini del problema
ecologico’. Christianity is largely responsible for the rise of science and
technology, but is not, pace Lynn
White, a source of eco­logical disruption, and has advocated an ethic of
stewardship for longer than Passmore recognises.

38. ‘Optimific, Right but
not Obligatory’, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 12, 1982, 317-20. Utilitarianism can be defended against
problems about supererogation raised by McConnell in Ratio without incurring the objections attracted by the account of
Sikora in Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

39. ‘Christian Attitudes to
Nature’, Journal of the History of Ideas,
44, 1983, 369-86. Christian attitudes to nature have not been
characteristically despotic. Biblical, pa­tristic, medieval and modern
Christian attitudes have been much more varied, and over­all much more benign,
than their traducers contend.

40. ‘Western Traditions and
Environmental Ethics’, in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare (eds.), Environmental Philosophy: A Collection of
Readings, St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983, 201-30.
Historically the tradition of stewardship has been much more pro­minent than
Peter Singer suggests; accordingly the roots of an environmental ethic exist
already, and there is no need for a new ethic to be devised, even if this were
possible. This work was also published in 1983 at Milton Keynes by The Open
University Press, and at University Park, Pennsylvania by Pennsylvania State
University Press.

41. ‘The Threat of Wrong’, Review Article of Jeff
McMahan, British Nuclear Weapons, For and
Against, London: Junction Books, 1981; J.E. Hare and Carey B. Joynt, Ethics and International Affairs, London
and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1982; Geoffrey Good­win (ed.), Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence, London
and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982; and Nicholas Sims (ed.), Explorations in Ethics and International Relations, Essays in Honour of
Sydney D. Bailey, London: Croom Helm, 1981, in Review of International Studies, 9, 1983, 147-52. Though the
conditional intention to use nuclear weapons is not wrong in itself, the actual
consequences of current postures, compared with those of moderate unilateral
disarmament, show the latter to be right.

42. ‘Unilateralism, Morality
and Faith’, Scottish Journal of Religious
Studies, 4, 1983,

3-14. Annette Baier is correct in holding that
there are secular reasons for uni­lateral acts of justice in an unjust world,
but they are not confined to the prospect of a Kantian kingdom of ends. They
(like Christian ethics) include consequentialist considerations. But there are
additional religious reasons for unilateralism.

43. ‘Methods of Ecological
Ethics’, Metaphilosophy, 14, 3&4,
1983, 195-208. Ecological ethics needs to rely upon a method of argument by
analogy, starting from received judgements, rather than appealing to loyalty to
the planetary biosphere.

44. ‘Metodi di etica
ecologica’, Lettera, III serie, 5,
July 1985, 3-23. A translation into Italian by Professor S. Gamberini of 43 (above).

45. ‘Work and the Human
Essence’, Journal of Applied Philosophy,
1, 1984, 141-50. Meaningful work is argued to be necessarily good for human
beings, granted their nature and need for self-respect. As paid work supplies
many with their only prospect of meaningful work, the opportunity of employment
should be open to everyone.

46. ‘Necessity and
Contingency in God’, Review Article of Keith Ward, Rational Theology and the Creativity of God, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell Publisher, 1982, in New
Blackfriars, 64, 1983, 35-41. Ward exaggerates both God’s necessity and his
contingency; his proper project of combining them in a single concept thus
fails in its execution.

47. ‘Fairness to the Third
World’, Crucible (journal of the Church
of England General Synod’s Board of Social Responsibility), October to December
1983, 171-76. Effort to assist the economic and social development of the Third
World is held to be obligatory on grounds not only of reparations but also of
international justice.

48. ‘Miller, Kripke, Bach
and the Meaning of Proper Names’, Southern
Journal of Philosophy, 21, 1983, 153-58. Theories of proper names which
deny their equivalence with non-trivial descriptions (which supposedly would
fail to apply to the bearers of the names in some possible worlds) are
confronted with counterexamples which are argued either to invalidate the
theories, or at least to narrow the scope of their application.

49. ‘Population Policies and
the Value of People’, Journal of Social
Philosophy, 14.4,

1983 (special conference
edition), 84-93. A modified version of the Total Theory of utilitarianism is
defended as the soundest basis for policies of curtailing population growth
which at the same time recognise the value of people.

50. ‘Intercultural Values
and Human Needs’, Proceedings of the
Seventeenth World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, 1983), Editions
Montmorency, 1988, Vol.II, 491-97. Even those who deny that rational
comparisons are possible between different societies or different ideological
discourses are argued to presuppose concepts of human beings and human needs
which supply a basis for such comparisons.

51. ‘Value in the
Wilderness’, Review Article of Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig (eds.), Ethics and the Environment, Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1983, in Metaphilosophy,
15, 1984, 289-304. The contributors dealing with applied issues neglect key
theoretical considerations raised by those dealing with fundamental issues; the
valuable work of the latter is sifted, and suggestions are made about how to
fill the gaps which it leaves.

52. ‘Thomas Traherne and the
Location of Intrinsic Value’, Religious
Traditions, 6, 1983, 66-74. (The original of which 35 above is a summary.)

53. ‘Overpopulation’, Proceedings of the Seventeenth World
Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, 1983), Montreal: Editions Montmorency,
1988, Vol. V, 554-555. The assumptions of believers in overpopulation are
criticised, and the value of nonhuman lives is related to the issue of human

54. ‘Population Policies and
the Value of People’ (a revised version of 49 above), in Yeager Hudson and
Creighton Peden (eds.), Philosophical
Essays on the Ideals of a Good Life,
Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1988, 191-201.

55. ‘Development: Some Areas
of Consensus’, Journal of Social
Philosophy, 17.2, Summer 1986, 36-44. Common ground can be found among
development theorists both about the concept of development, and about the
causes and remedies of underdevelopment.

56. ‘Balthasar Bekker and
the Decline of the Witch-Craze: The Old Demonology and the New Philosophy’, Annals of Science, 42, 1985, 383-395.
Balthasar Bekker’s Cartesian and theological criticisms of witch-beliefs were
more radical and significant than Hugh Trevor-Roper allows, and help to fill a
gap in the explanation of the decline of these beliefs recognised by Keith

57. ‘The Ethics of
Environmental Concern: A Reply to David H. Bennett’, The

Ecologist, 17, July 1985, 11-13. A response to some criticisms of the treatment
of Deep Ecology in The Ethics of
Environmental Concern.

58. ‘The Prospects for
Preservation’, Philosophical Inquiry
(New York), 8, 1986 (special issue on Ecology and Philosophy). Some divergences
and convergences of view with Janna L. Thompson’s ‘Preservation of Wilderness
and the Good Life’ are explored.

59. ‘The Good of Trees’ (28
above), republished in Donald VanDeVeer and

Christine Pierce (eds.), People, Penguins and Plastic Trees, Basic
Issues in

Ethics, Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1986,


60. ‘Methods of Ecological
Ethics’ (43 above), republished with an updating

postscript in Terrell Ward
Bynum and William Vitek (eds.) Applying

(Metaphilosophy Monographs
Series), Oxford and New York: The Metaphilosophy

Foundation in association
with Basil Blackwell, 1988, 176-190.

61. ‘Teaching Environmental
Philosophy at a British University’, Journal

Education (New York), 18.4, Summer 1987, 15-18. The introduction

of environmental philosophy
into four philosophical courses at University

College Cardiff is
discussed, Philosophical Aspects of Social and World

Problems, Philosophical
Theology, Moral Philosophy and Modern European Ideas.

62. ‘Biocentrism, Moral
Standing and Moral Significance’, Philosophica
(Ghent, Belgium), 39, 1987, 47-58. A critique of Paul Taylor’s biocentric
account of moral significance, incorporating arguments in favour of a
biocentric account of the scope of moral standing.

63. ‘The Ethics of Power’, African Philosophical Inquiry, 1.2, July 1987, 141-156. A theory is
expounded and defended of the justification, scope and limits of the activities
of collective bodies such as the state, and of the individual’s obligation to

64. Three contributions on the concept of person, in Arthur
Peacocke and Grant Gillett (eds.), Persons
and Personality, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 92, 193,
195f. Brief criticisms are advanced of Derek Parfit on teletransportation, and
of orthodox theologians on the doctrine of the incarnation.

65. ‘Some Current Values and Assumptions’, jointly composed
with two other members (Dr. Arthur Peacocke and Dr. Katharine Dell) of the Ian
Ramsey Centre, St. Cross College, Oxford Working Party, and comprising Chapter
2 (pp. 19-24) of the Report of the Ian Ramsey Centre on environmental ethics, Values, Conflict and the Environment,
edited by Robin Attfield and Katharine Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey Centre and
Centre for Applied Ethics, Cardiff, 1989. A survey of the range of principles
of value currently adhered to in environmental matters.

‘Reasoning About the Environment’, jointly composed with three members
(Professor R.M. Hare, Dr. J.P. Griffin and Mr. A. Darby) of the Ian Ramsey
Centre, St. Cross College, Oxford Working Party, and substantially revised by
myself to meet criticisms from the other members; the main philosophical
section (Chapter 3; pp. 25-46) of the Report of the Ian Ramsey Centre on
environmental ethics, Values. Conflict
and the Environment, edited by Robin Attfield and Katharine Dell, Oxford:
Ian Ramsey Centre and Centre for Applied Ethics, Cardiff, 1989. In the light of
the value-theory here defended, and of our contention that environmental values
are commensurable, an enlarged and modified method of cost-benefit analysis is
developed and defended with a view to implementation by planners and

67. ‘An Editorial Response’, Chapter 6 (pp. 83-86) of the
Report of the Ian Ramsey Centre on environmental ethics, Values, Conflict and the Environment, edited by Robin Attfield and
Katharine Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey Centre and Centre for Applied Ethics,
Cardiff, 1989. In view of the criticisms expressed by two members of the
Working Party of the main report in Chapter 5, the meaning and implications of
earlier chapters are further clarified and defended.

68. ‘Secular Humanism’,
paper commissioned for the Ian Ramsey Centre, St. Cross College, Oxford Working
Party Report on environmental ethics, Values,
Conflict and the Environment, edited by Robin Attfield and
Katharine Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey Centre and Centre for Applied Ethics,
Cardiff, 1989, of which it forms Chapter 8, pp. 91-96. The various distinctive
historical stances and values of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment humanism
relating to future generations and to nonhuman nature are reviewed so as to
exhibit both continuities and discontinuities with Judaic and Christian values.

69. ‘Environmentalism’,
paper commissioned for the Ian Ramsey Centre, St. Cross College, Oxford Working
Party Report on environmental ethics, Values,
Conflict and the Environment, edited
by Robin Attfield and Katharine Dell, Oxford: Ian Ramsey Centre and Centre for
Applied Ethics, Cardiff, 1989, of which it forms Chapter 10, pp. 105-108. The
diverse principles and values of different kinds of environmentalism are
reviewed and compared.

70. ‘Collegiality and
Efficiency in Universities’, in John K. Roth and Creighton Peden (eds.), Rights, Justice and
Community, Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992, selected papers
from the Oxford 1988 Conference of the North American Society for Social
Philosophy. The concept of efficiency employed by the Report of the Jarratt
Commission is critically analysed, and an alternative model of university
self-government commended for its capacity to uphold academic values.

71. ‘Derek Parfit and the
History of Ethics’, in History of the
Human Sciences, 2.4, October 1989, 357-371. Parfit’s exposition of
Christian ethics as founded on the principle of self-interest and his claims
that till recently normative and applied ethics have been entrammelled by
religion are contested, and alternative accounts both of Christian ethics and
of recent developments in normative and applied ethics are offered and

72. ‘Deep Ecology and
Intrinsic Value’, Cogito, 4/1, 1990,
61-66; a response to a critic, which also explains the indispensability of the
notion of intrinsic value.

73. ‘The Global Distribution
of Health Care Resources’ Journal of Medical
Ethics, 16/2, September 1990, 153-156; also in Harry Lesser (ed.), Ageing,
Autonomy and Ethics, Routledge,
1999 (see 122, below). The international aspects of health care and
developmental problems are investigated in the light of rival ethical
paradigms, which are shown to produce convergent policy directives.

74. ‘Making Decisions’, Philosophy Now, 1, 1991, 5-8. A
discussion of methods, problems and principles relating to decision-making.

75. ‘Has the History of
Philosophy Ruined the Environment?’, Environmental
Ethics, 13.2, 1991, 127-137. Eugene Hargrove’s critique of the impact of
the history of ideas and the history of philosophy on attitudes to the
environment is shown to be partially valid but partially in need of revision.

76. ‘Attitudes to Wildlife
in the History of Ideas’, Environmental History
Review, 15.2, 1991, 1-8. Eugene Hargrove’s account of the history of
attitudes to wildlife is appraised and subjected to qualification.

77. ‘The Comprehensive
Ecological Movement’, in Edgar Morscher, Otto Neumaier and Peter Simons (eds.),
Applied Ethics: Issues and Foundations,
Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, 1998, 9-27.
ISBN 0-7923-4965-2. A survey and critique of normative principles
involving rejection of anthropocentrism, and of models for environmental

78. ‘Development and
Environmentalism’, in Barry Wilkins and Robin Attfield (eds.) International Justice
and the Third World: Essays in the Philosophy of Development.,
London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 151-168, ISBN, 0-415-06924-6 (hb) &
0-415-06925-4 (pb). It is argued that morality and consistency oblige
environmentalists to support sustainable development in the Third World, and
that consistent developmentalists are obliged to support some of the deeper
kinds of environmentalism.

79. ‘Claims, Interests and
Environmental Concern’, in C.C.W. Taylor (ed.), Ethics and the Environment, Proceedings of Conference
held at Corpus Christi College, Oxford, 20-21 September 1991, Corpus Christi
College, Oxford, 1992; ISBN 0-9512844-l-X. In reply to Professor Bernard
Williams it is argued that the interests of nonhuman animals must figure
significantly both in environmental concern and in any satisfactory ethical

80. (Jointly with Barry
Wilkins) ‘Introduction’, in Robin Attfield and Barry Wilkins (eds.) International Justice
and the Third World.
Studies in the Philosophy of
Development London and New York: Routledge, 1992, 1-16. The eight
contributions are introduced.

81. ‘Clarke, Independence
and Necessity’ British Journal for the
History of Philosophy, 1.2, 1993, 67-82. While the version of the
cosmological argument advanced in Clarke’s Boyle Lectures is vulnerable to
criticisms such as Hume’s, the version of Clarke’s critic Daniel Waterland
remains defensible.

82. ‘Reasoning About the
Environment: Ethical Decision-Making’, in Azizan Haji Baharuddin (ed.), Environment and Development: Ethical and
Educational Considerations, Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research
(IKD), 1995, 177-198. ISBN 983-884-035-1. The method of Comprehensive Weighing
is related to Third World contexts.

83. ‘Genetic Engineering:
Can Unnatural Kinds Be Wronged?’, in Wheale, P.R. and McNally, R.M. (eds.) Animal Genetic Engineering: Of Pigs, Oncomice and Men, London: Pluto
Press, 1995, 201-208. ISBN 074530754X (hb) and 0745307558 (pb). It is argued
that transgenic animals can be harmed, and that also the ethics of generating
them is partially independent of this possibility.

84. ‘Sylvan, Fox and Deep
Ecology: A View from the Continental Shelf’, Environmental Values 2.1, 21-32, 1993. A critique of the philosophical
literature concerning deep ecology and also of one of its foremost critics.

85. ‘Development and
Environmentalism’ (see 78 above), in H. Odera Oruka (ed.), Philosophy, Humanity and Ecology: Volume I. Philosophy of Nature and
Environmental Ethics, Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies Press,
1994, 133-149. ISBN 9966-41-086-4.

86. ‘Rehabilitating Nature
and Making Nature Habitable’, in Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (eds.), Philosophy and the Natural Environment,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 45-57; ISBN 0-521-46903-1; ISSN
(as special number of the journal Philosophy) 0031-8191(1994)69+1;1-P. While it
is not impossible to restore nature, and both preservation and restoration are
proper roles for humanity, they are subordinate to making nature sustainably

87. (Jointly with Barry
Wilkins) ‘Sustainability’, Environmental
Values, 3, 1994, 155-158. Arguments are adduced against understanding
‘sustainability’ as implying ‘fit to be sustained’.

88. ‘The Precautionary Principle
and Moral Values’, in Timothy O’Riordan and James Cameron (eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle,
London: Cameron & May, 1994, 152-164; ISBN 1-874698-45-7. A survey of the
ethics of the precautionary principle.

89. ‘Etika ekologicheskoi
otvetctvennosti’ (‘Ethics of environmental responsibility’) (chapters from a
book), trans. L.I. Vasilenko and V.Y. Koslov, in Global Problems and Human Values, Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1990, 203-257. A translation of chapters 2, 5 & 10 of Robin Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern (see
lists of books).

90. ‘Ethics and the
Environment: the Global Perspective’, in Brenda Almond (ed.), An Introduction to Applied Ethics, Basil
Blackwell Publisher, 1994, 331-342, ISBN 0-631-19391-X. A critical review of
the environmental ethics field.

91. ‘John Laird and the Idea
of Value’, Journal of Value Inquiry,
29, 1995, 103-114; ISSN 0022-5363. A commissioned re-evaluation of a classical
text in value-theory.

92. ‘Population Growth and
Hope for Humanity’, in Creighton Peden and Yeager Hudson (eds.), The Social Power of Ideas, Lewiston, NY,
Queenston, Ontario and Lampeter, Dyfed: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995, 21-33. ISBN 0-7734-9043-4. A contribution to social theory, first made
at the Tenth International Social Philosophy Conference, Helsinki, 1993.

93. (Jointly with Andrew
Belsey) ‘Introduction’, in Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey (eds.), Philosophy and the Natural Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994, 1-12, ISBN 0-521-46903-1; ISSN 0031-8191(1994)69+1;
1-P. The sixteen contributions are introduced.

94. ‘Intrinsic Value and
Transgenic Animals’, in Andrew Johnson and Alan Holland (eds.), Animal
Biotechnology and Ethics, a collection on the ethics of transgenic
engineering, London: Chapman and Hall in 1998, 172-189; ISBN 0-412-75680-3
(hb), 0-412-59190-1 (pb). Coherent objections to transgenic engineering in
terms of intrinsic value are consequentialist rather than Kantian.

95. (Jointly with Susanne
Gibson) ‘Ethics’, in Michael Payne (ed.), Dictionary
of Cultural and Critical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, 178-182; ISBN
0631-171975 (hb). Summarises the history and current issues of ethics
(meta-ethical, normative and applied).

96. ‘Preferences, Health,
Interests and Value’, Justifying Value in
Nature, Special Topic Issue of The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy,
3:2, May 1995, 7-15 (of hard copy); ISSN 1071-5800. The capacity for health is
argued to be sufficient for having interests and moral standing; thus the
capacity for preferences is sufficient but unnecessary in these regards.

97. ‘Development and
Environmentalism’, in Azizan Haji Baharuddin (ed.), Environment and Development: Ethical and Educational Considerations,
Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research (IKD), 1995, 77-103. ISBN 983-884-035-1. (See 78, above.)

98. ‘The Meaning of Names
and Their Propositional Context’, Cogito,
9.2, 1995, 153-157; ISSN 0950-8864.
Michael Durrant has not shown the Context Principle of Frege and Wittgenstein
to be false, but it should still be rejected.

99. ‘El ambito de la
moralidad’ (an abridged version of chapter one of Robin Attfield, A Theory
of Value and Obligation), trans. Carmen Velayos Castelo,
in Jose Maria Garcia Gomez-Heras (ed.), Etica
del Medio Ambiente: Problema, Perspectivas, Historia, Madrid: Tecnos, 1997,
71-88; ISBN 84-309-2977-0. A study of the scope of moral standing.

100. ‘Western Traditions and
Environmental Ethics’ (see 40, above), trans. Juhani Pietarinen, in Markku
Oksanen and Marjo Rauhala-Hayes (eds.) Ymparistofilosofia. Kirjoituksia ymparistonsuojun eettisista
perusteista, Helsinki: Gaudeamus-kirja, 1997, 47-72; ISBN 951-662-694-7.

101. ‘Biozentrismus,
moralischer Status und moralische Signifikanz’ (trans. Dieter Birnbacher)
(first published in 1986 as ‘Biocentrism, Moral Standing and Moral
Significance’), in Dieter Birnbacher (ed.), Okophilosophie, Stuttgart: Reclam,
1997, 117-133; ISBN 3-15-009636-7. (See 62, above.)

102. ‘Preface’, forthcoming in Azizan Haji Baharuddin (ed.), Development, Ethics and the Environment,
Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research (IKD). Introduces environmental
ethics in the Malaysian context.

103. ‘Technology, Ethics and
the Environment’, forthcoming in Azizan Haji Baharuddin (ed.), Development, Ethics and the Environment,
Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Policy Research (IKD). Discusses the contribution
of ethics to the assessment of technology.

104. Ethics and Problems for
Sustainable Development, Working Paper 77 of the Man and Nature Humanities
Center, University of Odense, 1996, 15pp., ISSN 0907-1385; ISBN 87-89844-63-7.
Strong Sustainable Development is defended against environmentalist and other

105. ‘Too High a Theme? Of
Finitude, Predication and Analogy’, Scottish Journal of Religious Studies,
17.1, 1996, 5-19. Language about God, like language used of nonhuman animals,
can bear a sense analogous to that of the same language when used of human
beings, despite the fears of the seventeenth-century poet Richard Baxter that,
without supernatural help, the divine nature may be “too high a theme”.

106. ‘Ecophilosophy, Poverty
and the Future’, in Gilbert Ogutu, Pentti Malaska and Johanna Kojola (eds.), Futures Beyond Poverty: Ways and Means Out
of the Current Stalemate, selected papers from the XIV World Conference of
the World Futures Studies Federation (Nairobi, 1995), Helsinki: World Futures
Studies Federation, 1997, 21-25; ISBN 951-738-747-4. Environmental philosophy
need not be open to charges of indifference to poverty; its concern for future
people commits its adherents to recognition of the needs of current people also
and thus the requirements of social development.

107. ‘Progress, Nature and
Metaphysics’, in Carsten Bengt-Pedersen and Niels Thomassen (eds.), Nature and Lifeworld: Theoretical and Practical
Metaphysics, the proceedings volume of the Inter-Nordic Institute of
Philosophy, Odense, 1995, Odense: Odense University Press, 1998, 11-26; ISBN:
87-7838-311-0. Some forms of belief in progress are compatible with recognition
of nature’s value, provided that nature is not construed as natural capital,
and that its otherness is recognised.

108. ‘Existence
Value and Intrinsic Value’, Ecological
Economics, 24 (special number, edited by Bo Gustafsson of the Swedish
Colloquium for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, University of Uppsala),
1998, 163-8; ISSN: 0921-8009. Despite Jonathan Aldred’s defence of existence
value, such value fails to cover much of the extension of intrinsic value, and
should be replaced in decision-making by direct consideration of items of
intrinsic value, as represented by proxies.

109. ‘Climate Change and
Ethics’, Philosophy Today, No.22, May
1996, 8-9. Report of the Workshop of this title of the Society for Applied
Philosophy, London, 3 February 1996.

110. ‘Discounting, Jamieson’s
Trilemma and Representing the Future’, in T. Hayward and J. O’Neill (eds.), Justice, Property and the Environment: Social and Legal Perspectives, Aldershot:
Ashgate, 1997, 85-96; ISBN 1-85972-5295. Discounting is only justified where
special reasons exist; relatedly, future people should be represented by
proxies in decision-making.

111. ‘Natur erhalten
oder Menschen ernähren?’, German translation of ‘Saving Nature Versus Feeding
People?’ (not previously published), in Conceptus:
Zeitschrift für Philosophie (Salzburg), XXIX, nr. 74, 1996 (published
1997), pp. 27-45; ISSN: 0010-5155. A criticism of Holmes Rolston’s view that
nature preservation should sometimes be given priority over saving human life.

112. ‘Environmental Ethics
(Overview)’, in Ruth Chadwick (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Applied Ethics, San Diego: Academic Press, 1998, vol. 2, 73-81. ISBN (of vol. 2): 0-12-227067-3. A historical
and critical survey of the field of environmental ethics.

113. ‘Christianity’, in Dale
Jamieson (ed.), A Companion to
Environmental Philosophy, Oxford and
Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000, 96-110; ISBN 1-55786-910-3. An historical overview
of Christian attitudes to nature.

114. ‘Rehabilitating Nature
and Making Nature Habitable’ (first published 1994), republication in William
Throop (ed.), Environmental
Restoration:Ethics, Theory and Practice; Amherst, New York: Humanity Books,
2000, pp. 113-126; ISBN 1-57392-818-6. (A republication of 86, above.)

115. ‘Discounting,
Jamieson’s Trilemma and Representing the Future’, (first published in 1997),
republished in Kriterion, Zeitschrift für
Philosophie (Salzburg, Austria), 12, (1997) 1999, 24-32; ISSN 1019-8288.
(See 110, above.)

116. ‘Saving Nature, Feeding
People and Ethics’, Environmental Values,
7, 1998, 255-68; ISSN: 0963-2719. Criticises Holmes Rolston’s claim that nature
preservation should sometimes be given priority over feeding people.

117. ‘Environmental Ethics
and Intergenerational Equity’, Inquiry,
41, 1998, 207-22; ISSN: 0020-174X. Principles, policies and a model for
relations between generations are discussed and sifted.

118. ‘Responsibility for the
Global Environment’ (presented at Development Conference, Aberdeen, 1996), International Journal of Applied Philosophy
(Florida) 12, 1998, 181-6; ISSN: 0739-098X. Argues that states have obligations
to participate in treaties necessary to protect the global environment.

119. ‘Gli atteggiamenti cristiani verso la natura’ (‘Christian Attitudes to

in Mariachiara
Tallachini (ed.), Etiche della terra:
Antologia di filosofia dell’ ambiente, Milan: Vita e Pensiera, 1998,
103-127. ISBN 8834319028

120. ‘Aldo Leopold: A Brief
Appraisal’, Reflections, Newsletter of
the Program for Ethics, Science and the Environment (Department of
Philosophy, Oregon State University), 3, 1998, 7. Leopold is rightfully
influential as an ecologist, but philosophically naive.

121. ‘Humpty Dumpty, Carroll
and Frege’, Cogito, 13.1, 1999,
55-59; ISSN: 0950-8864. Compares Carroll’s theory of stipulative meaning with
Alice’s common sense approach, in the light of Gottlob Frege’s distinction
between sense and reference.

122. ‘The Global
Distribution of Health Care Resources’ in Harry Lesser (ed.), Ageing,
Autonomy and Ethics, Routledge,
1999, 133-141; ISBN 1-84014-971-X. (See 73, above).

123. ‘Are Promises to Repay
International Debt Binding?’ (presented to International Society for Value
Inquiry at World Congress of Philosophy,
Boston, 1998), Journal of Social
Philosophy, 32.4, Winter 2001, 505-511; ISSN 0047-2786. John Searle’s
findings about debt obligations do not imply that Third World countries have
overriding obligations to service or repay debts.

124. ‘Depth, Trusteeship,
and Redistribution’, in Klaus Brinkmann (ed.),
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World
Congress of Philosophy, Volume 1, Ethics, Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy
Documentation Center, 1999, 159-168; ISBN: 1-889680-05-2. Trusteeship is
defended and shown to involve global restructuring.

125. ‘Evolution, Theodicy
and Value’ (presented at the Science and Religion Forum Conference, Hoddesdon,
1996), The Heythrop Journal, 41.3,
July 2000, 281-296; ISSN 0018-1196 (200007) 41:3: 1-N. Neither nature nor
natural creatures can be regarded as immoral; nature, including predation and
parasitism, is argued to be compatible with creation by a benign creator.

126. ‘Meaningful Work and
Full Employment’, Reason in Practice,
1.1, 2001, 41-48; ISSN, 1473-589X. Arguments from essential capacities and from
self-respect continue to support the value of meaningful work, for which full
employment is indispensable.

127. ‘Society and Ethics: A
Dialogue’, Philosophical Writings,
no. 13, Spring 2000, 19-28; ISSN 1361-9365. A dialogue between a moral
philosopher and a sociologist.

128. ‘The Good of Trees’,
republished in Peter C. List (ed.), Environmental
Ethics and Forestry: A Reader, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000,
98-113; ISBN 1-56639-784-7 (hb) and 1-56639-785-5 (pb); a book in the series
‘Environmental Ethics, Values and Policy’, ed. Holmes Rolston III.

129. ‘Sustainability, Global
Warming, Population Policies and Liberal Democracy’, in Marcel Wissenburg and
John Barry (eds.), Sustaining Liberal
Democracy: Ecological Challenges and Opportunities , Basingstoke and New
York: Palgrave, 2001, 149-160. ISBN 0-333-91981-5. Liberal democracy is argued
to be compatible with sustainable policies for greenhouse gas emissions and for

130. ‘Postmodernism, Value
and Objectivity’, Environmental Values,
10.2, 2001, 145-162; ISSN 0963-2719. Belief in objective intrinsic value is defended
against postmodernist and relativist critiques.

131. ‘Global Warming,
Justice and Future Generations’, Philosophy
of Management, 3.1, 2003, 17-23; ISSN, 1473-589X. Principles for carbon
emission regimes are sifted, and an egalitarian, population-based principle

132. ‘Differentiated
Responsibilities’, in Markku Oksanen and Juhani Pietarinen (eds.), Philosophy and Biodiversity, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004, 237-250; ISBN: 0-521-80430-2 and (pbk), 2007,
(978)0521039147. Responsibilities are both universal and geared to the
situations of agents, as the Rio Declaration (1992) recognises.

133. ‘Global
Citizenship and the Global Environment’, in Nigel Dower and John Williams
(eds.), Global Citizenship,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002, 191-200; ISBN, 0-7486-1547-4.
Global citizens recognise universal obligations, not least with regard to the
shared, objective global environment.

134. ‘Ecological
Policies and Ecological Values’, trans. K. Boudouris as ‘Oikologikes politikes
kai oikologikes axies’ in Oikologikes
Axies, ed. Konstantine Boudouris, Athens: University of Athens Technology
Institute of Applied and Ecological Philosophy, University of Athens, 2002,
9-26; ISBN, 960-918440-5. New grounds are offered for preferring biocentrism as
a value-theory to anthropocentrism.

135. ‘ The Global
Distribution of Health Care Resources’ (73 above), in Ruth Chadwick and Doris
Schroeder (eds), Applied Ethics
(vol.3), London, Routledge, 2001, 231-238; ISBN 0-415-20837-8.

136. ‘To Do No
Harm: The Precautionary Principle and Moral Values’ (a revision of 88
above), Reason and Practice, 1.3, 2001, 11-20; ISSN, 1473-589X.

137. ‘The Good of
Trees’, in John O’Neill, R. Kerry Turner and Ian J. Bateman (eds.), Environmental Ethics and Philosophy,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2001, 328-347, ISBN 1-84064-221-1. (A republication of 28 above.)

138. ‘The Good of
Trees’, in David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott (eds.), Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works, New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 58-71; ISBN 0-19-513909-7.
(A republication of 28 above.)

139. ‘Saving
Nature, Feeding People and Ethics’, in Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III
(eds.), Environmental Ethics: An
Anthology, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 2002, 463-471; ISBN 0-631-22294-4. (A
republication of 116 above.)

140. ‘Biocentric
Consequentialism, Pluralism and ‘the Minimax Implication’: A Reply to Alan
Carter’, Utilitas, 15.1 (March 2003),
76-91; ISSN 0953-8208. Biocentric consequentialism is defended against
criticisms from Alan Carter relating to population, quality of life and
environmental sensitivity.

141. ‘Global
Warming, Justice and Future Generations’, in Harto Hakovirta (ed.), Six Essays on Global Order and Governance,
Turku: Academy of Finland Figare/Safir Project, Department of Political
Science, University of Turku, 2003, 71-86; ISBN 951-29-2600-8. A republication
of 131 (above).

142. ‘Ecological
Sustainability in a Developing Country such as South Africa? A Philosophical
and Ethical Inquiry’ (jointly authored with Johan Hattingh), The International Journal of Human Rights,
6.2 (Summer 2002), pp. 65-92; ISSN 1364-2987. Conceptual and ethical problems
for ecologically sustainable development are shown not to prevent such
development being reconcilable with social justice, even in a developing
country such as South Africa.

‘Verification, God-Talk and Metaphysics’, The
New Theologian, 13.1, Winter 2002, 4-5. The Verification Principle, far
from undermining metaphysics, undermines itself; there is nothing incoherent in
reasoning about what transcends verification.

‘Nationalism, Global Citizenship, Environmental Values, and the Common Heritage
of Humanity’, in Jouni Paavola and Ian Lowe (eds), Reconceiving Environmental Values in a Globalizing World, London:
Routledge, 2005, 38-50; ISBN 0415343623.
(Paperback, 2007, ISBN: 9780415459877; ISBN10: 0415459877.) Defends a
cosmopolitan but non-anthropocentric ethic and attitudes of global stewardship
as historically precedented and urgently required for coping with shared global

145. ‘Sustainable
Development, Sustainable Livelihoods and Land Reform in South Africa: A
Conceptual and Ethical Inquiry’ (jointly authored with Johan Hattingh and
Manamela Matshabaphala), in Third World
Quarterly, 25.2, 2004, 405-21; ISSN 0143-6597. The relations between
sustainable development, sustainable livelihoods and land reform are explored,
and the case against and that in favour of land reform in South Africa are
presented and appraised. A 'research highlight' in which Rabi Thapa re-presents
and highlights this article has been published (18/5/05) on id21, the DfID
website, at;
a further abstract has also appeared in the Sociological Abstracts database of
CSA Illumina (June 2005).

146. 'J.R.
Lucas', Dictionary of Twentieth-Century
British Philosophers (2 vols.), ed. Stuart Brown, Bristol: Thoemmes
Continuum, 2005, vol. I, 586-90; ISBN 1-84371-096-X. A 2500-word account and
appraisal of the work of this major philosopher.

'Environmental Problems and the Ethics of Science', in Lebanese National
Commission for UNESCO (ed.), Ethics of
Science and Technology, Beirut: Lebanese National Commission for UNESCO,
2003, 150-156; ISBN 9953-0-0209-6. A discussion of ethical aspects of regional
problems including fresh water, energy and global warming.

148. 'The Concept
of Sustainable Development Revisited', in Yeditepe
'de Felsefe (Philosophy at Yeditepe University, Istanbul), 1.3, 2004,
300-309; ISSN 1304-0197. The radical core of this concept is defended against
both economistic interpretations and charges of irremediable vagueness.

149. ‘Rousseau,
Clarke, Butler and Deism’, British
Journal for the History of Philosophy, 12.3, 2004, 429-443; ISSN 0960-8788.
Rousseau is argued to have produced a defence of deism sufficient to uphold it
against eighteenth-century criticism and make it still a potential option
amongst metaphysical positions.

'Environmental Ethics, Environmental Problems and the Ethics of Science', in Ethics, Law and Society, Volume 1 (eds.
Jennifer Gunning and Søren Holm) Aldershot: Ashgate, August 2005, 95-101; ISBN:
0-7546-4583-5. A revision of 147 above.

'Environmental Sensitivity and Critiques of Stewardship', in R.J. Berry (ed.), Environmental Stewardship: Critical
Perspectives—Past and Present, London: T&T Clark/Continuum, January
2006, 76-91; ISBN 0567031172 (hb), 0567030180 (pb). Religious and secular
versions of belief in human stewardship of the earth are clarified and defended
against several varieties of criticism.

152. 'Biocentric
Consequentialism and Value-Pluralism: A Response to Alan Carter', Utilitas, 17.1, March 2005, 85-92; ISSN:
0953-8208. A rejoinder to Alan Carter's criticisms of biocentric
consequentialism and advocacy of value-pluralism.

153. 'Leibniz,
the Cause of Gravity, and 'Physical Theology'', in Studia Leibnitiana 36.2, 2005 (published 2007), 238-244; ISSN,
0039-3185. Farrer’s category of physical theology is applied to Leibniz’s
Newtonian opponents.

154. 'Future
Generations: Considering All the Affected Parties', translated into Spanish by
Adrián Pradier, under the supervision of Carmen Velayos, as 'Generaciones
futuras: considerando todes das partes afectadas', in Isegoria (Spain), 32, junio 2005 (published December 2005), 35-46;
ISSN, 1130-2097. Current agents have responsibility for differences that can be
made to the quality of life of future people and other future creatures,
insofar as these are foreseeable.

155. 'Sustainable
Forests, Global Responsibility and the Earth Charter', Silva Carelica (Finland), 49, 2005, 11-25; ISSN 0780-8232.
Sustainable development must be global, and based on an ethic such as that of
the Earth Charter, recommended here to foresters.

‘Environmental Ethics and Global Sustainability’, in Henk A.M.J. ten Have
(ed.), Environmental Ethics and
International Policy, Paris: UNESCO, 2006, 69-87, ISBN-10: 92-3-104039-1;
ISBN-13: 978-92-3-104039-9 (in a UNESCO series on Ethics of Science and
Technology; a volume arising from UNESCO
Expert Working Party on environmental ethics meetings in Paris and New Orleans
of 2004). An analysis of the state of the art of environmental ethics and of
implications for international action.

157. 'Development and
Environmentalism', in Christine Koggel (ed.), Moral Issues in Global Perspective (2nd edn, 3 vols.),
vol. 3 (Moral Issues), Guelph
(Canada): Broadview Press, 2006, 272-282; ISBN 1551117495. A republication of
78 above.

158. ‘The Shape of
a Global Ethic’, Philosophy & Social
Criticism, 32.1, 2006, 5-19; ISSN: 0191-4537; DOI (Digital Object
Identifier): Problems including
future-related responsibilities preclude most kinds of ethical theory from suitability
as a global ethic, but practice-consequentialism is argued to overcome such
problems, provided it adopts a biocentric form.

159. 'In Defense
of Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Ethics, 27, 2005, 335-36;
ISSN, 0163-4275. My book 'Environmental Ethics' is defended against a reviewer
whose describes it unrecognisably.

160. ‘Unprojected
Value, Unfathomed Caves and Unspent Nature’, Environmental Values, 14.4, 2005, 513-18; ISSN, 0963-2719. Passages
of poetry are used to illustrate that not all value is to be regarded as a
projection of human sentiments.

161. 'Altruism
and Environmental Concern' (joint paper with Stephen Moller), Copula, Journal of the Department of
Philosophy, Jahangirnagar University (Bangladesh), 22, June 2005, 51-59;
ISSN, 1563-0692. Diverse theories of environmental ethics are tested for their
coherence with the phenomenon of altruism.

162. 'Is the
Concept of Nature Dispensable?', Ludus
Vitalis: Journal of Philosophy of Life Sciences (Mexico), vol. xiv, no. 25, June 2006, 105-117; ISSN: 1133-5165. Also to be translated
into Spanish, for a collection to be edited by Teresa Kwiatkowska. The
concept of nature is argued to be
indispensable, not least
for ethics, despite the claims of
strong constructivists.

163. ‘Reconciling
Individualist and Deeper Environmentalist Theories? An Exploration’, forthcoming in Patrick Blandin and Donato
Bergandi (eds), The Structural links
between Ecology, Evolution and Ethics: The Virtuous Epistemic Circle, in
the series ‘Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science’, Springer (Amsterdam,
The Netherlands), 2012, 127-139, ISBN
978-04-007-5066-1; the proceedings volume of an international conference on
evolutionisms, ecologies and ethics, held at the National Museum of Natural
History, Paris, May 2005,. A critique of Alan Carter’s pluralism.

164. 'Is the
Concept of Nature Dispensable?', in Stephen Voss, Berna Kylync and Gurol Irzyk
(eds), Logic and Philosophy of Science,
vol. 5 of Proceedings of the XXI World Congress of Philosophy,
based on the 2003 World Congress of
Philosophy (Istanbul), Ankara: Philosophical Society of Turkey, 2007, 59-63;
ISBN 978-975-7748-34-2 (TK No); 978-975-7748-42-7 (5.C). (A shorter version of
162 (above).)

165. ‘The Good of
Trees’, in J. Baird Callicott and Clare Palmer (eds), Environmental Philosophy: Critical Concepts in the Environment (5
vols), London: Routledge, 2004, vol. 1, ISBN: 0-415-32646-X. A republication of
28 above.

166. ‘Cudworth,
Prior and Passmore on the Autonomy of Ethics’, in Sarah Hutton and Douglas
Hedley (eds), Platonism at the Origins of
Modernity, published in the series International Archives in the History of
Ideas, Dordrecht: Springer, 2008, 147-158; ISBN 978-1-4020-6407-7 (hb);
978-1-4020-6407-4 (e-book).

167. ‘Applied
Ethics’, in A.C. Grayling, Andrew Pyle and Naomi Goulder (eds), Continuum Encyclopedia of British Philosophy
(4 vols), New York: Thoemmes Continuum, 2006, vol. I, 124-129; ISBN: 1-84371-141-9. An overview of
applied ethics in Britain from the seventeenth century.

168. ‘Mediated Responsibilities, Global Warming and
the Scope of Ethics’, Journal of Social
Philosophy, 40.2, 2009, 225-236; ISSN 0047-2786. Both individuals and
governments are responsible even when the impacts of their action or inaction
are mediated.

169. ‘Sustainable Development Revisited’, in
Zeynep Davran (ed.), Human Rights,
Volume 3 of Proceedings of the XXI World
Congress of Philosophy, based on the
2003 World Congress of Philosophy (Istanbul), Ankara: Philosophical
Society of Turkey, 2007, 185-189; ISBN 978-975-7748-34-2 (TK No);
978-975-7748-48-9 (3.C). (A shorter version of 148 (above).)

170. ‘Lynn White, Jr, 1907-1987’, in J. Baird
Callicott and Robert Frodeman (eds), Encyclopedia
of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, Farmngton Hills, MI: Thomson Gale,
2008, vol. II, 400-402. Conveys central ideas and criticisms of Lynn White and
his well-known thesis.

171. ‘Hunger’, in J.
Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman (eds), Encyclopedia
of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, Farmngton Hills, MI: Thomson Gale,
2008, vol. I, 495-499. Discusses the nature and causes of world hunger and
related obligations in an environmental context.

172. ‘Biocentrism’, in
J. Baird Callicott and Robert Frodeman (eds), Encyclopedia of Environmental Ethics and Philosophy, Farmngton
Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2008, vol. I, 97-100. Discusses the varieties of
biocentric thought and objections thereto.

173. ‘Beyond the
Earth Charter: Taking Possible People Seriously’, Environmental Ethics, 29.4, Winter 2007 (published February 2008),
359-367; ISSN, 0163-4275. The Earth Charter needs to be strengthened to cope
with the problem that future obligations are not owed to identifiable
individuals, but to whoever lives in future times.

174. ‘Has the History of Philosophy Ruined the
Environment?’ (75 above), to be republished online by Thomas Seiler at

Responsibilities and the Banquet of the Kingdom’, Journal of Global Ethics, 5.1, 2009, 33-41; ISSN (print) 1744-9626;
(online) 1744-9634. In reply to Chris Groves, the ethics-of-care model is
argued to stand in need of supplementation with regard to non-reciprocal
responsibilities from other models, including that of hospitality.

176. ‘Mediated
Responsibilities, Global Warming and the Scope of Ethics’, in Ruth Irwin (ed.) Climate Change and Philosophy, London:
Continuum, 2010, 183-196; ISBN 978-0-8264-4065-5. (An expanded version of 168

177. ‘Global Warming,
Equity and Future Generations’, Human
Ecology Review, 17.2, Winter 2010, 102-105; ISSN 1074-4827. A defence of
equal per capita carbon emissions entitlements and of Contraction and Convergence,
as presented at the 22nd World Congress of Philosophy (Seoul, Korea,

178. ‘Social History,
Religion and Technology: An Interdisciplinary Investigation into White’s
‘Roots’’, Environmental Ethics, 31.1,
2009, 31-50; ISSN, 0163-4275. White’s controversial ‘Roots’ paper involves,
pace Harrison, a critique of Christianity that misses the mark, while, as
Whitney argues, disregarding economic and institutional causes of ecological
problems, yet relevantly focussing on the influence of values and beliefs.

179. ‘Philosophy on
Poetry, Philosophy in Poetry’, in Jinfen Yan and David Shrader (eds), Creating a Global Dialogue on Value Inquiry,
Papers from the XXII World Congress of Philosophy, Lewiston, NY and
Lampeter, UK: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009, 417-432; ISBN 978-0-7734-4702-8. A
discussion of whether Lucretius’ philosophical poem would be countenanced in
Plato’s Republic.

180. ‘Ecological
Issues of Justice’, Journal of Global
Ethics, 5.2, 2009, 147-154; ISSN (print) 1744-9626; (online)
1744-9634. A study of the implications for global justice and global warming of
the wide scope of the concepts of ‘moral patient’ and ‘moral agent’, which also
compares the Greenhouse Development Rights approach with the approach of
Contraction and Convergence.

181. 'The Global
Distribution of Health Care Resources in the Twenty-First Century’, to be
published in a collection to be edited by Harry Lesser, Justice for Older People, published in Amsterdam and New York:

182. ‘Climate
Change: The Ethical Dimension’, in Matteo Mascia and Lucia Mariani (eds), Ethics and Climate Change: Scenarios for
Justice and Sustainability, Padua: CLEUP, 2010, (a collection based on the
Fondazione Lanza international conference on climate change, Padua, October
2008), 77-84. Key ethical principles and possible international approaches
relevant to addressing climate change are presented and discussed.

183. ‘Climate Change,
Environmental Ethics, and Biocentrism’ in Ved Nanda (ed.), Climate Change and Environmental Ethics, New Brunswick, NJ and
London, UK: Transaction, 2011, 31-41; a paper based on one sent to the Toda
Foundation Honolulu international conference on climate change of November
2008. A biocentric approach is defended and shown to justify significant action
on clmate change.

184. ‘Social History,
Religion and Technology: An Interdisciplinary Investigation into White’s
‘Roots’’ (178 above), to be republished in a Brill collection on
anthropocentrism to be edited by Rob Boddice, 283-305

185. ‘Ecological
Issues of Justice’ (see 180 above), in Heather Widdows and Nicola Smith (eds), Global Social Justice, London and New
York: Routledge, 2011, 82-89; ISBN 978-0-415-57941-4.

186. ‘Exploring Ethical and Religious Attitudes to Sustainability’, in Olivier
Urbain (ed.), Ethical Transformations for
a Sustainable Future (the book version of Peace & Policy, 14, 2009), Piscataway, NJ : Transaction, 2010,
33-40; ISBN 978-1-4128-1445-4

187. ‘Sustainability’, in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics,
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012; ISBN: 9781405186414; . Presents a non-normative account of

188. ‘The
Precautionary Principle’ Guest Editorial, UK
Centre for Bioscience Bulletin, 29, Spring 2010, 1, ISSN 1740-6692 (print);
1740-6706 (online). All science students should be taught about the
Precautionary Principle.

189. ‘Biocentrism’,
entry in Craig W. Allin (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Environmental Issues (4 vols), Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 2011, vol. I,
146-147; ISBN: 978-1-58765-735-1. An account of the common features and diverse
versions of biocentrism in environmental philosophy.

190. ‘Brundtland
Commission’, entry in Craig W. Allin (ed.), Encyclopedia
of Environmental Issues (4 vols), Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 2011, vol. I,
p. 205; ISBN: 978-1-58765-735-1. A short depiction of Our Common Future, produced by the World Commission on Environment
and Development in 1987.

191. ‘Darwin, Meaning
and Value’, in Environmental Values,
20.3, 2011, 309-314; ISSN: 0963-2719. A reply to some criticisms from Alan
Holland about the role of value in life being seen as meaningful.

192. ‘Darwin’s Doubt,
Non-deterministic Darwinism and the Cognitive Science of Religion’, in Philosophy, 85.4, 2010, 465-483; ISSN 0031-8191. Plantinga’s argument that evolutionary theory
makes our beliefs unreliable applies to deterministic versions of Darwinism and
of the cognitive science of religion, but non-deterministic versions (like
those of Rose, Lewontin, Ward and Miller) escape it.

193. ‘Intrinsic Value
and Transgenic Animals’, in Manish A. Vyas (ed.), Being for the Other: Issues in Animal Rights and Ethics, Delhi:
Daya Publishing House, 2011, 41-57; ISBN: 9788189233686. A republication of 94

194. ‘Evolution and Agapeistic
Ethics’, in Harriet A. Harris (ed.), God,
Goodness and Philosophy, Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, 123-129. Far from being
precluded by evolutionary theory, altruism can be reconciled with it, which is
just as well, because it happens.

195. ‘Creation, Environment
and Ethics: Some Cardiff-Based Contributions to Philosophy’, in Rebekah
Humphreys and Sophie Vlacos (eds), Creation,
Ethics and Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, (officially
2010, but actually February 2011), 1-12; ISBN (10) 1-4438-2508-5; ISBN (13)

196. ‘Reply to Dower’,
in Rebekah Humphreys and Sophie Vlacos (eds), Creation, Ethics and Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars
Press, 2010, 33-37. Some qualifications are presented to Nigel Dower’s account
of individual responsibility with relation to climate change. ISBN (10)
1-4438-2508-5; ISBN (13) 978-1-4438-2508-5. DOI of this chapter:

197. ‘Reply to
Holland’, in Rebekah Humphreys and Sophie Vlacos (eds), Creation, Ethics and Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars
Press, 2010, 53-60. ISBN (10) 1-4438-2508-5; ISBN (13) 978-1-4438-2508-5. Some
responses are presented to Alan Holland’s objections to themes such as creation
by God and the relation of evolution to the meaning of life.

198. ‘Reply to Southgate’,
in Rebekah Humphreys and Sophie Vlacos (eds), Creation, Ethics and Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars
Press, 2010, 75-85. ISBN (10) 1-4438-2508-5; ISBN (13) 978-1-4438-2508-5. Some
responses are presented to Christopher Southgate’s objections to themes such as
stewardship and theodicy. DOI of this chapter: 10.13140/2.1.3608.7364.

199. ‘Reply to Crisp’,
in Rebekah Humphreys and Sophie Vlacos (eds), Creation, Ethics and Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars
Press, 2010, 97-104. ISBN (10) 1-4438-2508-5; ISBN (13) 978-1-4438-2508-5. Some
responses are presented to Roger Crisp’s defence of hedonism and critique of
Attfield’s value theory. DOI of this chapter: 10.13140/2.1.2236.5766.

200. ‘Reply to
Palmer’, in Rebekah Humphreys and Sophie Vlacos (eds), Creation, Ethics and Environment, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars
Press, 2010, 121-127. ISBN (10) 1-4438-2508-5; ISBN (13) 978-1-4438-2508-5.
Some responses are presented to Clare Palmer’s critique of consequentialist
ethics; practice-consequentialism can accommodate problems that are beyond the
scope of other forms of consequentialism. DOI of this chapter:

201. ‘Global Warming,
Equity and Future Generations’, Ludus
Vitalis, Journal of Philosophy of Life Sciences (Mexico), vol. xviii, no.
34, 2010, 185-189; ISSN 1133-5165. A defence of equal per capita carbon
emissions entitlements and of Contraction and Convergence.

202. ‘Nolt, Future
Harms and Future Quality of Life’, a comment on David Nolt, ‘How
Harmful Are the Average American’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions?’, in Ethics, Policy and Environment, 14.1,
2011, 11-13; ISSN 2155-0085 (print); 2155-0093 (online). Obligations with
regard to future generations cannot be entirely based on avoiding harms, and
must partly relate to upholding quality of life.

203. ‘Biocentrism and
Artificial Life’, Environmental Values,
21.1, 2012, 83-94. Biocentrism recognises certain limits on the generation of
artificial life, as was explained at the Zürich Workshop on Synthetic Life of
July 2010.

204. ‘The Moral Case
for Climate Change Mitigation’, in (a website about politics in
Wales), published at 11am on Thursday 25th November, 2010: see

205. ‘Ecological
Issues of Justice’ (a revision of 180 above), in Sigurd Bergmann and Heather
Eaton (eds), Ecological Awareness:
Exploring Religion, Ethics and Aesthetics, Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2011,
183-191; ISBN: 978-3-8258-1950-7

‘Reflections on the Cancun Conference of 2010’,
(translated by Carmen Velayos Castelo as ‘Reflexiones sobre la Conferencia de
Cancun de 2010’) in Dilemata (Spain),
6. May 2011, 47-51; ISSN, 1989-7022. The ethical inadequacies of the Cancun agreement
are weighed against the formidable obstacles that were overcome and its
restoration of hope of an eventual comprehensive agreement.

Anthropocentrism’, Anthony O’Hear (ed.), Philosophy
and the Environment (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 29-46; ISBN 9781107696075; ISSN:

Ethics’, in Katherine Clark (ed.), Ethics
in the Biosciences: Resources, References and Tools for Ethics Teaching in the
Biosciences, Leeds: UK Centre for Bioscience Briefing, 2011, 11; ISBN:

on Species Egalitarianism’, a comment on David Schmidtz, ‘On Respecting
Everything’, in Ethics, Policy &
Environment, 14.2, 2011, 139-141; ISSN 2155-0085 (print); 2155-0093 (online).

Evolution, Sperber, Memes and Religion’, Philosophical
Inquiry (Thessaloniki), 35, 3-4, Summer-Fall 2011, 36-55; ISSN, 1105-235X.
Dan Sperber’s theory of culture as a susceptibility is questioned by reference
to the Homeric poems.

‘Biocentrism’, in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics,
Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012; ISBN: 9781405186414; . Argues for species-inegalitarian
biocentrism, against the egalitarian variety of Paul Taylor and James P.

Environmentalists, Species and Ignorance’ in Environmental Ethics, 33.3, 2011, 307-316; ISSN, 0163-4275.
Elliot Sober’s critique of environmentalism is criticised in turn, for
mischaracterising what he calls ‘the argument from ignorance’ and for
misconstruing the grounds for preserving the last surviving members of a

Standing, Saving the Planet and Meaningful Life’, in Dialogue, 38, April 2012, 36-40. The expanded recognition of the
bearers of moral standing is capable of motivating far-reaching ethical
concern; motivation need not be grounded in making one’s own life meaningful.

Religion and Synthetic Biology’, in Worldviews,
17, 2013, 26-35. Reflections on the Zurich 2010 Symposium on Artificial Life.

Biology, Deontology and Synthetic Bioethics’, in Ethics, Policy &
Environment, 15.1, 2012,
1-4; ISSN 2155-0085 (print);
2155-0093 (online) Paul Thompson is criticised for conceding too much to
Kantian deontology to be able to present clear obligations for synthetic

‘Environmental Ethics: An Overview’, in eLS (the
electronic encyclopedia of the life sciences), Chichester: John Wiley &
Sons Ltd., ?2012,; online
ISBN, 9780470015902; DOI, 10.1002/9780470015902.a0024201.

‘Ecological Civilization and Sustainable
Development: Address to the World Cultural Forum, (Taihu, China) 2010’, in The Path to World Harmony: Cultural
Dialogue—A Collection of Papers of Chinese and Foreign Experts and Scholars of
the First Conference of The World Cultural Forum (Taihu, China), being
published by The World Cultural Forum at Beijing.

‘Required Reading’, The Philosopher’s Magazine, 3rd Quarter, 2012, 104-107;
ISSN 1354-814X (print), 2048-4674 (online). Reviews some of my reading related
to Ethics: An Overview.

Morality and Creation: The Importance of a Contingency’, Philosophical Inquiry (Athens), 2014. A meditation on the world
and, despite its disasters, its inbuilt goodness.

220. ‘Understanding Values in
Science and Society: The Role of the Humanities’, (‘Comprender Valores en la
Ciencia y en la Sociedad: El Papel de las Humanidades’), in Luis Palacios
Bañuelos (ed.), Donde Habita el Olvido:
Las Humanidades hoy, Leon, Spain: CSED, 2013, 165-173. DOI: 10.13140/2.1.4111.6482 A case is
presented for the continuing importance of the humanities.

221. ‘Relationships, Obligations, Normativity and
Depth’, in Theoretical and Applied Ethics.
A response to James Kellenberger’s thesis that normativity derives from

222. ‘Ecological
Issues of Justice’, in Lucas Andrianos, Konstantinos Kenanides and Alexandros
Papaderos (eds), Ecological Theology and
Environmental Ethics, Chania, Greece: Institute of Theology and Ecology,
Orthodox Academy of Crete: 2009, 217-224 (See 205 above)

223. ‘Henry Odera
Oruka, Ecophilosophy and Climate Change’, Thought
and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya, New Series, Vol.4, No.2, December 2012,
51-74; ISSN 2076-7714 Discusses the stance that Odera would have had towards
climate change, as an African ecophilosopher, if he had lived beyond 1995.

224. ‘What Moral
Consequences Does the Environmental Crisis Have?’, in Vittorio Hosle (ed.), Dimensions of Goodness,
Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013. The implications of the
environmental crisis and the changes of attitudes it generates are investigated
and related to one another.

225. ‘Some
Ethico-Medical Implications of Climate Change: Communicating the Ethics of the
Global Greenhouse’, forthcoming in Proceedings of Philosophy Yesterday, Today
and Tomorrow Conference, Singapore, 2013. The implications of climate change
for environmental refugees and thus for medical research are investigated.

226. ‘Popper and
Xenophanes’, Philosophy, 89.1, 2014,
113-133. Xenophanes, whom Karl Popper considered the originator of the method
of conjectures and refutations, did not always employ a Popperian methodology;
nor did Popper himself when (brilliantly) reconstructing the life of

227. ‘Biotechnology, Biomedicine and the Precautionary
Principle’, Proceedings of the
International Work-Conference on Bioinformatics and Biomedical Engineering,
April 7-9, 2014, Granada (Spain), eds. Francisco Ortuño and Ignacio Rojas, (2
vols), vol. 2, 936-40. The precautionary principle is shown to be applicable to
biotechnology and biomedicine, and should be taught to all students of these

‘Some Ethical Implications of Climate Change and its
Impacts on Environmental Refugees’, in GSTF
Digital Library (Singapore), 2014. The impacts
of climate change on environmental refugees are brought to light.

‘Future Generations’ in Henk ten Have (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, (3
vols.), Cham, Switzerland: Springer,
2016. Through sustainable policies and practices, current and future interests
can be reconciled.

Ethics and the Role of Plants’, in the Proceedings of the Planta Europa
Conference, held at Chania in May 2014, Plants
for People, People for Plants, edited by L. Andrianos, J.W. Sneep, K.
Zorbas and D. Woodcock, Chania, Greece: OAC Publications, 2014, 47-52: ISBN
978-618-82088-0-3. Themes of environmental ethics are illustrated by reference
to the classification of Cretan plants.

‘Stewardship’, in Hen ten Have (ed.), Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, Springer, 2015. Stewardship, whether
religious or secular, remains a defensible stance of great relevance to global
environmental problems.

John Clutterbuck) ‘Climate Refugees, Disappearing States and
Territorial Compensation’, in the Proceedings of Philosophy Yesterday, Today
and Tomorrow Conference, Singapore, 2014. Territorial compensation should be
considered for states deprived of their territory by climate change.

‘The Moral Urgency of Mitigation’, in International Social Science Journal
(UNESCO), 211/212, March-June 2013, 19-22. (Abstract on page 1.) Explains the
vital importance of an international agreement on climate change mitigation.

‘Engineering Ethics, Global Climate
Change and The Precautionary Principle’, in Satya Sundar Sethy (ed.), Contemporary Ethical Issues in Engineering,
Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2015, 38-47; ISBN 9781466681309 and 1466681306.
(Relates the precautionary principle to engineering ethics.)

‘Ecological Justice, Climate Change and Animals’, in Lucas A. Andrianos,
Jan-Willem Sneep and Guillermo Kerber (eds), Sustainable Alternatives to Povery Reduction and Eco-Justice,
(first edition) Chania: Institute of Theology and Ecology, 2013, 64-70; ISBN
978-960-86383-8-9. If animals are ethically significant, they must have a place
in our understanding of justice.

‘Ecological Justice, Climate Change and
Animals’, in Lucas A. Andrianos, Jan-Willem Sneep, Guillermo Kerber and Robin
Attfield (eds), Sustainable Alternatives
to Povery Reduction and Eco-Justice, (second edition) Newcastle-upon-Tyne:
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, 52-60. A republication of 235 (above) with
a new appendix.

‘HADD, Determinism and Epicureanism: An
Interdisciplinary Investigation’, in Roger Trigg and Justin L. Barrett (eds), The Roots of Religion: Exploring the
Cognitive Science of Religion, Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2014, 75-90; ISBN 978-1-4724-2731-1. DOI of this chapter:
10.13140/2.1.4928.4163. The HADD hypothesis is tested by reference to ancient
Epicureanism, and found to be credible only in a non-deterministic form.

‘Teaching Ethics in Colleges and
Universities’, Scholars Journal of Arts,
Humanities and Social Sciences, 3.1, February 2015; ISSN:
2347-5374(Online); ISSN 2347-9493(Print). A reply to Eric Matthews’ review in Philosophy, 2014.

‘Bioethics, The Precautionary Principle,
and Future Generations’, in Ethics of
Environmental Health, edited by Friedo Zölzer and Gaston Meskens, New York
and Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017, 69-75; ISBN-10: 1138186627; ISBN-13:
978-1138186620. The Precautionary Principle is distinguished from the Principle
of Maximin, and (construed as concerning avoidable reductions to quality of
life) shown to be applicable to the environmental health of future generations.

‘Sustainability and Management’, in Philosophy of Management, 14.2, June
2015, 85-93; (DOI) 10.1007/s40926-015-0008-4.
Sustaining quality of life is central to sustainable development. Limiting
companies’ carbon footprints is crucial to this. (Not open access.)

‘Can Biocentric Consequentialism Meet Pluralist Challenges’, in Avram Hiller, Ramona Ilea and Leonard Kahn
(eds), Consequentialism and Environmental
Ethics, New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, 35-53. Argues that
biocentric consequentialism can respond adequately to various challenges,
including ones raised by Alan Carter.

‘Progress and Directionality in Science, Society and
in Journal of the Philosophy of History,
10, March 2016, 29-50, ISSN 1872-2636. A comparative review of the case for progress and
directionality in science, the humanities, society and nature, with related
theological reflections.

‘The Ethics of Geo-Engineering’,
forthcoming in the Proceedings of the XXIII
World Congress of Philosophy, Athens, 2013. Ethical
issues arising from the main kinds of climate engineering are considered, and
found to count strongly against all the more radical varieties.

‘Lucas, John Randolph’, in Robert Audi
(ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy (third edition), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015,
614-15; ISBN 978-1-107-01505-0 (hb); 978-1-107-64379-6 (pb). Stresses Lucas’s
contributions to philosophy, including his Gödelian argument in defence of

‘Biocentrism’ (revision of 211 (above)),
in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International
Encyclopedia of Ethics, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016; ISBN:
9781405186414; . Argues for
species-inegalitarian biocentrism, against the egalitarian variety of Paul
Taylor and James P. Sterba, and against the ecocentrism of Gregory M. Mikkelson
and Colin A. Chapman.

‘Popper’s Parmenides’, in Maria Adam (ed.), Global Ethics and Politics in Relation to
Ecological Philosophy, published on behalf of International Association for
Greek Philosophy at Athens by Ionia Press, 2016; ISBN 978-960-7670-823, pp.
240-256. Popper’s interpretation of the relation between Parmenides’ two
philosophies is appraised.

(With Kate Attfield) ‘The Concept of “Gaia”’, in eLS (the electronic encyclopedia of the
life sciences), John Wiley & Sons Ltd., Chichester, August 2016, , DOI: 10

(With Rebekah Humphreys) ‘Justice and
Non-human Animals, Part I’, Bangladesh
Journal of Bioethics, 7.3, 2016, 1-11; ISSN 2226-9231 (print); 2078-1458

(With Rebekah Humphreys) ‘Justice and
Non-human Animals, Part II’, Bangladesh
Journal of Bioethics, 8.1, 2017, 44-57; ISSN 2226-9231 (print); 2078-1458

Citizenship’, International Encyclopedia
of Ethics, edited Hugh LaFollette, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,

251. ‘Environmental
Philosophy and Environmental Ethics for Sustainability’, in Terry Marsden
(ed.), The SAGE Handbook of Nature (3
vols), Los Angeles and London: Sage, 2018, Vol I, 38-58. An overview of
the field, stressing the challenges of sustainability.

252. ‘Forest Ethics’, in Angela
Kallhoff, Marcello Di Paola, and Maria Schörgenhumer
(eds), Plant Ethics: Concepts and Applications, London and New York:
Routledge, 2018, 121-130

‘Opinion: Philosophy and Climate’ in the HPS&ST (History and
Philosophy of Science) website,
January 2019. Stresses the place of the precautionary principle in climate

(With Melissa Beattie) ‘The Paris Conference,
Compensation and Climate Change’, in Electronic Green Journal, published out of UCLA, 2018. Advocates compensation
in international climate change negotiations, while recognising that
international funding for adaptation may serve the same purpose.

‘Some Ancient Philosophical and Religious Roots of
Modern Environmentalism’ in Ailsa Hunt and Hilary Marlow (eds), Ecology and Theology in the Ancient World:
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2019. Traces some of the roots of environmentalism to ancient influences.

‘Grammars of Creativity’, The Heythrop Journal, March 2019,
DOI 10.1111/heyj.13189 Seeks to improve on
Margaret Boden’s theory of creativity, by introducing tradition, community and
the insights of Austin Farrer.

Kate Attfield) ‘Principles of Equality and
Diversity: Managing Equality and Diversity in a Steiner School’,
forthcoming in Muddassar Sarfraz (ed.), Sustainable
Management Practices, London: IntechOpen, 2019. The principle of equality
of consideration underpins managerial and pedagogical practices at the Cardiff
Steiner School.

‘Air Pollution, Health and Ethics’, in American Journal of Biomedical Science and
Research, 3.1, May 2019, 60-63. While we should phase out diesel-powered
cars, we should not do this on the principle of simply minimizing harm.

‘Africa and Climate Change’, forthcoming in Utafiti (Dar-es-Salaam), 14.2, 2019.
Africa should participate in climate change mitigation and adaptation,
alongside the other continents, granted commensurate assistance to do so.

260. ‘Panentheisms, Creation and Evil’, in Open Theology, 5: 2019;

pp. 166-171. ISSN: 2300-6579. This paper discusses the adequacy of
different versions of panentheism in view of their stance on creation and on
evil. It rejects the Strict Panentheism of Whitehead and Hartshorne, but
defends the shared stance of Moltmann and Peacocke.

261. ‘Principlism, Public Health and the Environment’, in Journal of Public Health, fdaa12, 2020;
. Objections
to principlism are considered, and the principles of prudence and of precaution
praised, in the light of environmental problems of public health.

262. ‘Futurity, Selves
and Further Organisms’, in Animal
Sentience. This commentary on Treves, Santiago-Avila and Lynn, ‘Just
Preservation’ upholds the authors’ general view, but seeks clarification on
bio-proportionality, selves, predicting future interests and individuating

263. ‘Aristotle, Nature and the Great Chain of
Being’, in Konstanine Boudouris and Adam Roth (eds), The World Congress of Philosophy, The Philosophy of Aristotle, vol
1 (Proceedings of the International Association for Greek Philosophy Annual
Conference, 2016), Athens: Ionia Publications, 2018. 9-17, ISBN
078-960-7670-85-4. Appraises the degree of Aristotle’s adherence to the cluster
of doctrines that Lovejoy presented as ‘The Great Chain of Being’, a cluster
dominant in European thought from the neo-Platonists to the Romantics;
Aristotle contributed some elements, but would have rejected others. However,
his belief in nature’s permanence and underlying invulnerability distances him
from environmentalism.

264. ‘Biocentrism,
Climate Change and the Spatial and Temporal Scope of Ethics’, in Brian Henning
and Zachary Walsh (eds), Climate Change
Ethics and the Non-Human World, New York and London: Routledge, 2020,
63-74; ISBN 9780367406103. Presents
arguments for a biocentric approach to climate change ethics, and against an
anthropocentric one.

265. ‘Environmental Justice and Climate Justice’, in Paul Harris (ed.), A Research Agenda for Climate Justice; ISBN 978-1-78811-816-3-02. Discusses nature and extent of climate justice, which must incorporate both future generations and non-human creatures.


Joint paper with Rebekah Humphreys: ‘Textbook Teaching: On the Innovativeness of Traditional Teaching Methods for Achieving Excellence in Student Scholarship and Reducing Workload Demands'


Here are three of the books to which Robin has contributed:      

Environmental Stewardship is listed as #151 in the list, from 2006

Plant Ethics is #252 on the list and Ecology and Stewardship in the Ancient World is #255.

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For additional details on the environmental ethics books I have written, please get in touch.